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Lifelong learning is essential in computing, given the dynamic nature of the field. Employers and curricular reviewers recognize the value of being self-directed in support of becoming a lifelong learner. The ACM/IEEE-CS Computing Curricula 2020 report identifies self-directed as having elements of self-motivation, determination, and independence. Little is known, however, about how to cultivate this disposition in computing courses. The motivation of this study is to better understand what behaviors computing students believe are self-directed. This study’s research questions are: 1) What do students describe as their self-directed practices in computing? and 2) What do students report are factors that prevent them from being self-directed? Assignments in five undergraduate computing courses from four institutions included prompts to elicit student’s reflections on how they were self-directed (or not). Thematic content analysis using the constant comparative method produced eight categories of self-directed behaviors (utilizing external resources, learning necessary material, working independently, assessing oneself, planning ahead, applying useful techniques, completing the assigned work, and reviewing against expectations). Thematic analysis also resulted in five categories of factors that impeded the self-directed behavior (assignment structure, unsuccessful effort, self-sufficiency, insufficient motivation, and insufficient time). Understanding how students describe self-directedness can help educators design pedagogical and assessment approaches that facilitate self-directed student behaviors in the classroom. 

Computing is everywhere, and it's here to stay. Computing is crucial in many disciplines and influences every discipline. It’s unlikely we'll willingly return to a society unmediated by computing. How do our institutions proceed? This BoF asks, "Should computing be a requirement for all college and university students?" Some say yes, citing potential for improving equity-of-access, for expanding students' capabilities, for diversifying the people who understand and critique computing, and for increasing the diversity of computing participation. Some say no, citing the lack of equity-of-outcomes, the infeasibility of teaching all students equitably, and students' need for freedom in choosing what they study. Some say, "Let's consider the spectrum of possibilities... ." This session will discuss these possibilities, expressed and constrained by 2024's forces. Is computing's value saturated - or soon to be? Or is computing a meta-skill, whose practice in learning-to-learn amplifies individual efficacy along all paths? Is Computing1 too gate-kept to be as equitable a GenEd as Composition1? Or does requiring computing, in fact, help dismantle those gates? Can students adequately learn about core computing concepts via non-CS courses that use computing? What might required computing entail? We invite and welcome all with an interest in computing-as-degree-requirement, program-requirement, or GenEd offering. The session's seed materials will highlight evidence against the idea, for the idea, and across its vast, uncertain middle. Our BoF proposers include researchers and educators, both non-CS-requiring and CS-requiring, as well as non-CS-required and CS-required "educatees." Join us! 

Many recent proposals to increase the resilience of the Web PKI against misbehaving CAs face significant obstacles to deployment. These hurdles include (1) the requirement of drastic changes to the existing PKI players and their interactions, (2) the lack of signaling mechanisms to protect against downgrade attacks, (3) the lack of an incremental deployment strategy, and (4) the use of inflexible mechanisms that hinder recovery from misconfiguration or from the loss or compromise of private keys. As a result, few of these proposals have seen widespread deployment, despite their promise of a more secure Web PKI. To address these roadblocks, we propose Certificates with Automated Policies and Signaling (CAPS), a system that leverages the infrastructure of the existing Web PKI to overcome the aforementioned hurdles. CAPS offers a seamless and secure transition away from today’s insecure Web PKI and towards present and future proposals to improve the Web PKI. Crucially, with CAPS, domains can take simple steps to protect themselves from MITM attacks in the presence of one or more misbehaving CAs, and yet the interaction between domains and CAs remains fundamentally the same. We implement CAPS and show that it adds at most 5% to connection establishment latency.